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This study evaluated the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firms Financial Performance in 
Nigeria Quoted Banks in order to determine the Banks Financial Performance before and after 
the introduction of Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria. The main objective of this study is 
to evaluate Board Composition with a view to determining its impact on Firms Financial 
Performance. Board Composition was used as measure of Corporate Governance while Return 
on Capital Employed (ROCE), was used to operationalize Financial Performance. The study is 
anchored on Shareholders theory. The Population of this study comprised fifteen (15) banks 
whose shares are quoted on Nigeria Stock Exchange. Judgmental sampling technique was used 
to select seven (7) banks from the entire Population of the study (which makes up the sample 
size). Data were obtained from secondary source (published financial statements of the selected 
quoted banks) covering the periods of 2003-2014. The method of data analysis utilized was 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis. A model was formulated. The findings from this 
study showed that Board composition has a negative, though insignificant impacts on ROCE 
during the 2003 - 2008 period (p1) and during the 2009 - 2014 period (p2), In conclusion, the way 
in which corporate governance is organized differs among countries, depending on the economic, 
political and social contexts. We therefore recommend that the directors of board should adhere 
to CBN regulations and guidelines in bank management, with this, they can achieve their aim 
and shareholders confidence will be restored, on the board  
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Corporate governance refers to the management of an entity affairs in the interest of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. It is also concerned with the creation of a balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. To achieve this, there is 
the need to encourage efficient use of resources, accountability in the use of power, and, the 
alignment of the interest of the various stakeholders, such as, individuals, corporations and the 
society. Corporate governance is now widely accepted as being concerned with improved 
entity’s performance. Viewed from this perspective, corporate governance is all about 
accountability, boards, disclosure, investor involvement and related issues. It therefore suggests 
that the composition of the board will determine to a larger extent, the financial performance of 
an entity. This is because financial performance is a function of decision made by the directors 
and other arm of the corporate governance. These include Audit committee, Risk management 
committee and Remuneration committee to mention few. Based on this premise, the study 
intends to evaluate the extent to which Board Composition impact financial performance. 
 
Objective of the Study 
To determine the impact of Board Composition on the value of Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE) in quoted banks in Nigeria 
 
Research Hypothesis 
Board Composition has no significant impact on the value of return on capital employed 
 
Review of Related Literature 
Corporate Governance  
The term Corporate Governance refers to the rules, processes or laws by which institutions are 
operated, regulated and governed. It is developed with the primary purpose of promoting a 
transparent and efficient banking system that will engender the rule of law and encourage 
division of responsibilities in a professional and objective manner. Effective corporate 
governance practices provides a structure that works for the benefit of stakeholders by ensuring 
that the enterprise adheres to accepted ethical standards and best practices as well as formal laws 
(CBN, 2014). In the context of this research, it refers to rules and regulations that guide the 
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operations of banks. Accordingly, the aim of corporate governance centers at ensuring that 




 Source: Adapted from George and Karibo, 2014 
Board Composition: 
 Board composition refers to the number of independent non-executive directors on the board 
relative to the total number of directors. An independent non-executive director is defined as an 
independent director who has no affiliation with the firm except for their directorship (Clifford & 
Evans, 1997). There is an apparent presumption that boards with significant outside directors 
will make different and perhaps better decisions than boards dominated by insiders. Fama & 
Jensen, 1983 (as cited in Bansal & Sharma, 2016) suggest that non-executive directors can play 
an important role in the effective resolution of agency problems and their presence on the board 
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can lead to more effective decision-making, hence improved firm performance. Bocean, 2001, 
(as cited in Mirza & Javed, 2013) gave five principles of corporate governance: 
i. Protection of shareholders’ rights 
ii. Equitable treatment of shareholders  
iii. Protection of stakeholders’ rights  
iv. Proper disclosure and transparency 
v. Fulfillment of responsibilities by board 
 
Board Size 
Board size refers to the number of people on the board- executive or non- executive directors. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in 
Nigeria (2014) recommends that the number of non-executive directors should be more than that 
of executive directors subject to a maximum board size of 20 directors. This is considered to be a 
crucial characteristic of the board structure. Large boards could provide the diversity that would 
help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainties. Olayinka 
(2010) opines that this positively affects performance by reducing high earnings management, 
restatements and fraud. Fama & Jensen, 1983 (as cited in Bandsal & Sharma, 2016) argue that 
the increase in the number of the members of the board slows down the decision-making 
processes of the firm, causing the board to pass off the problems, thus, leading to a decrease in 
firm value and effectiveness. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested that as size of the board grows, 
the decision-making processes will slow down and this will cause communication problems and 
impacts the firm’s performance negatively. 
 
Board Size and Composition as prescribed by CBN, 2014 
a. The size of the Board of any bank or discount house shall be limited to a minimum of 
five (5) and a maximum of twenty (20). 
b. Members of the Board shall be qualified persons of proven integrity and shall be 
knowledgeable in business and financial matters, in accordance with the extant CBN 
Guidelines on Fit and Proper Persons Regime. 
c. The Board shall consist of Executive and Non-Executive Directors. The number of Non-
Executive Directors shall be more than that of Executive Directors. 
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d. The Board of banks shall have at least two (2) Non-Executive Directors as Independent 
Directors while that of discount houses shall have at least one (1) as defined in the CBN 
guidelines on the Appointment of Independent Directors 
 
Firm Financial Performance 
Firm Financial Performance is a subjective measure of how well a firm can use assets from its 
primary mode of business and generate revenues. This term is also used as a general measure of 
a firm's overall financial health over a given period of time, and can be used to compare similar 
firms across the same industry or to compare industries or sectors in aggregation. George and 
Karibo (2014) defined it as the success in meeting pre-defined objectives, targets and goal within 
a specified time target. Some of the aspects that must be considered when attempting to define 
performance are: time frame and its reference point. It is possible to differentiate between past 
and future performance. And it has been shown that past superior performance does not 
guarantee that it will remain superior in the future (Santos & Brito, 2012).  
 
Aspects of Firm Performance  
Santos and Brito (2012) identified the Superior financial performance, which can be represented 
by profitability, growth and market value, underpins corporate governance practice in 
organizations. Profitability is a measure of a firm’s past ability to generate returns while growth 
demonstrates a firm’s past ability to increase its size. Increasing size, even at the same 
profitability level, will increase its absolute profit and cash generation. This, according to thier 
research, goes to show that larger firm size can bring economies of scale and market power, 
leading to enhanced future profitability. Market value, on the other hand, represents the external 
assessment and expectation of firms’ future performance, which must have a correlation with 
historical profitability and growth levels,  while incorporating future expectations of market 
changes and competitive moves.  
 
The non-financial performance facets are: Customers’ Satisfaction, Employees’ Satisfaction, 
Environmental Performance and Social Performance. But the study focus on Financial 


















Source: Field Research, (2016) 
 
Return on Capital Employed (R.O.C.E) 
ROCE is one of the several profitability ratios used to evaluate a company's performance. It is 
designed to show how efficiently a company makes use of its available capital, by looking at the 
net profit generated in relation to every dollar of capital utilized by the company. This ratio does 
not concern itself with external investment or the earnings from such investment. It seeks to 
ascertain the level of profit made by the firm as a going concern. It is expressed as  
Profit before interest and taxes – Income from external investment 
Share Capital + debt + Reserve – external investment 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Experts in corporate governance have identified the Agency theory, stakeholder’s theory and 
Shareholders theory as the three prominent theories of corporate governance, which are briefly 































Agency theory:  
According to Egbunike and Abiahu (2017, p. 27), "Agency theory has been widely used in 
literature to investigate the information asymmetry between principals (shareholders) and agent 
(management)". The advent of Modern Corporation created a separation between ownership and 
control of wealth (Berle & Means, 1932). This is because as firms grow beyond the means of a 
single owner, who may be incapable of meeting the rapidly increasing obligations of the firm, 
there is the tendency that the ownership structure of the business will grow also with the 
attraction of new investors. As the firm continues to grow, the owners of the enterprise employ 
some professional executives to help them run the enterprise efficiently on a day to day basis. 
This arrangement creates a relationship in which the owners of the business become the 
principals and the executives, whom they contracted to help manage their firms, the agents.  
 
Agency theory argues that as firms grow in size the shareholders (principals) lose effective 
control, leaving professional managers (agents), have more information than principals to 
manage the affairs of the business. Often times, this transfer of firm‘s control from principals to 
agents, creates a moral hazard which results in a situation where, to maximize their own wealth; 
agents may face the dilemma of acting against the interests of their principals. Since principals 
do not have access to all available information at the time a decision is being made by an agent, 
they are unable to determine whether the agent’s actions are in the best interest of the firm. 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976) cited in Egbunike and Abiahu (2017)) 
 
When the interests and utility functions of the self-serving agents coincide with those of the 
principals, agency problem will not exist. However, when there is divergence, agency costs are 
incurred by the principals because the agents will want to maximize their own utility at the 
expense of the principals. 
 
Stakeholders’ Theory  
The stakeholders’ theory was adopted to fill the observed gap created by omission found in the 
agency theory which identifies shareholders as the only interest group of a corporate entity. 
Within the framework of the stakeholders’ theory, the problem of agency has been widened to 
include multiple principals (Sand, Garba & Mikailu, 2005).  The stakeholders’ theory provides 
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that the firm is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host society 
that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm's activities. (Aminu, 
Aisha & Mohammad, 2015). The stakeholders’ theory attempts to address the questions of which 
group of stakeholders deserve the attention of management. The stakeholders’ theory proposes 
that companies have a social responsibility that requires them to consider the interest of all 
parties affected by their actions. The original proponent of the stakeholders’ theory suggested a 
re-structuring of the theoretical perspectives that extends beyond the owner- manager-employee 
position and recognizes the numerous interest groups. Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004), 
suggested that: “If organizations want to be effective, they will pay attention to all and only those 
relationships that can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organizations purpose”.  
 
Shareholders Theory 
Shareholder value theory is the dominant economic theory in use by business. Maximizing 
shareholder wealth as the purpose of the firm is established in our laws, economic and financial 
theory, management practices, and language. Business schools hold shareholder value theory as 
a central tenet. Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman (1970) strongly argues in favor of maximizing 
financial return for shareholders. His capitalistic perspective clearly considers the firm as owned 
by and operated for the benefit of the shareholders. He says ‘there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud. Friedman’s statements reflect three fundamental 
assumptions that lend support to the shareholder view of the firm. The first is that the human, 
social, and environmental costs of doing business should be internalized only to the extent 
required by law. All other costs should be externalized. The second is that self-interest as the 
prime human motivator. As such, people and organizations should and will act rationally in their 
own self-interest to maximize efficiency and value for society. The third is that the firm is 
fundamentally a nexus of contracts with primacy going to those contracts that have the greatest 
impact on the profitability of the firm. 
 
               Having reviewed the above theories, this study is anchored on shareholders theory, because the 
goal of the firm is to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
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long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud in order to maximize shareholders wealth. The Board of directors is 
accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the bank. Specifically, and in line 
with the provisions in the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2004, directors owe the 




Olayinka, (2010) investigated the Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance 
in Nigeria. This study examines the impact of board structure on corporate financial performance 
in Nigeria. It investigates the composition of boards of directors in Nigerian firms and analyses 
whether board structure has an impact on financial performance, as measured by return on equity 
(ROE) and return on capital employed (ROCE). Based on the extensive literature, four board 
characteristics (board composition, board size, board ownership and CEO duality) have been 
identified as possibly having an impact on corporate financial performance and these 
characteristics are set as the independent variables. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression was used to estimate the relationship between corporate performance measures and 
the independent variables. Findings from the study showed that there is strong positive 
association between board size and corporate financial performance. Evidence also exists that 
there is a positive association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate 
financial performance. However, a negative association was observed between directors’ 
stockholding and firm financial performance measures. In addition, the study reveals a negative 
association between ROE and CEO duality, while a strong positive association was observed 
between ROCE and CEO duality. 
 
In another study, carried out by Akingunola, Adekunle and Adedipe (2013) on Corporate 
Governance And Bank’s Performance in Nigeria (Post – Bank’s Consolidation), they considered 
estimated models. Binary probit was adopted to test the covariance matrix computed on 
structured questionnaire to bank’s clients and it was discovered that the variables such as 
independence, reliance, and fairness helps in the effective performance of banks but the major 
significant ones in this consolidation period are accountability and transparency of bank’s staff. 
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Also, least square regression analysis was adopted to convey the relationship between bank 
deposits and bank credit. The estimation of the developed model was found that banks total 
credit was positively related but not significantly determinant factors of bank’s performance, and 
bank deposit was found to be positively related to bank performance but was  
 
In a related research conducted by George and Karibo (2014) on Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Financial Performance of Listed Firms in Nigeria: A Content Analysis, the 
study adopted a content analytical approach to obtain data through the corporate website of the 
respective firms and website of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A total of 33 firms 
were selected for the study cutting across three sectors: manufacturing, financial and oil and gas. 
The result of the study showed that most of the corporate governance items were disclosed by the 
case study firms. The result also showed that the banking sector has the highest level of 
corporate governance disclosure compared to the other two sectors. The result thus indicates that 
the nature of control over the sector have an impact on companies’ decision to disclose online 
information about their corporate governance in Nigeria; and that there were no significant 
differences among firms with low corporate governance quotient and those with higher corporate 




The research design adopted for this study is ex-post facto research design. The choice of this 
design was chosen because the researchers are reporting what is already in existence (that is 
published financial statements). 
 
Population of the Study 
The population of the study consist of  all universal banks whose shares are quoted on the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange as at 31st December 2015 (which are 15, out of the 21 banks operating 
in the country).Therefore, the population size is 15 banks. The data for this study are limited to 
the financial statement of listed banks whose annual reports are available on Nigeria Stock 
Exchange (NSE) under the period of study (2003 -2014). These periods are chosen base on the 
availability of data. 
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Sampling and Sampling Technique 
This study employed purposive or judgmental sampling technique to select seven (7) commercial 
banks out of fifteen (15) banks operating currently in Nigeria. This selection is base only on 
banks whose shares are quoted on the floor of the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) and whose 
financial statements are available. The technique is well suited for determining the sample as it 
provides an equal probability of selection and as such minimizes selection bias. 
 
Source of Data  
Secondary source of data was used for this research. The data were collected from financial 
statements of the seven (7) universal banks selected from the Nigerian Stock Exchange listing for 
the period of twelve (2003 – 2014) financial years. 
 
Method of Data Analysis 
The study utilized the Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis as the method of data 
analysis, having presented the descriptive statistics and the Pearson Correlation analysis. 
 
Model Specification 
The model for this study is in line with prior studies (Mansur and Ahmad, 2013, Becht, Bolton, 
and Olayinka , 2010) and is as specified below; 
CG = f (ROCE,  U) … … … … (i) 
In econometric form, the model is re-written as 
  BC =  a +β1 ROCE + u … … (ii) 
     where:  
                CG        =      Corporate Governance 
BC  =   Board Composition 
ROCE =   Return On Capital Employed 
 
S/N   Variable Measurement 
  ROCE Return on Capital Employed PBIT/NA 
Source: Researcher's Compilation (2016)  





Analysis of Data 
 
Descriptive statistics  




       Mean 0.6139   0.2646  
Median 0.6000   0.1321  
Maximum 0.8750   3.4803  
Minimum 0.3333   -5.9472  
Standard Deviation 0.1026   0.9433  
Sample Variance 0.0105   0.8898  
Jarque-Bera 51.5667   22.2257  
Prob 0   0  
Observations 84   84  
       
BC: Board Composition;ROCE: Return on Capital Employed  
Source: Researchers’ Computation using E-views 7.0 
 
From the descriptive statistics of the variables as shown in table 1 above, it is observed 
that the mean value for board composition (BC) is 0.6139 which suggest that over 61% of 
the banks in the sample have their boards composed as required by the regulatory 
authorities while about 39% of the banks have a different composition. The standard 
deviation of 0.1026 indicates that the introduction of IFRS has improved the board 
composition as most of the banks’ boards are now well composed. The Jacque -Bera-
statistic of 51.5667and the p-value of 0.00 indicate that the series does not deviate from 
normality (p<0.05).  
 
Finding 
Board composition has a negative, though insignificant impacts on ROCE during the 2003 - 
2008 period (p1) and during the 2009 - 2014 period (p2), (-0.024, - 0.001, p1 = 0.071 > 0.05, & p2 
= 0.962> 0.05). 
 
Conclusion 
Corporate Governance has become a popular discussion topic in developed and developing 
countries. The widely held view that corporate governance determines firm performance and 
protects the interests of shareholders has led to increasing global attention. However, the way in 
13 
 
which corporate governance is organized differs between countries, depending on the economic, 
political and social contexts.This paper studies Corporate Governance variables (BC) and firms’ 
performance variable (ROCE) 
 
Recommendations 
We recommend that the directors of board should adhere to CBN regulations and guidelines in 
bank management, with this, they can archive their aim and shareholders confidence will be 
restored, on the board. We also advise the companies to have more independent directors within 
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Appendix 1: Raw Data  
    Corporate Governance  Firm Performance  
BANKS YEARS NED ED TD PBT  PAT   EQUITY  
 TOTAL 




2014 10 6 16 
   
46,142,422  
   
39,941,126  
   
274,155,786  
   
1,981,955,730  
   
185,836,455  
2013 9 7 16 
   
31,365,396  
   
26,211,844  
   
245,181,998  
   
1,704,094,012  
   
182,504,814  
2012 10 6 16 
   
37,028,147  
   
36,353,643  
   
1,515,754,463  
   
1,515,754,463  
   
179,173,173  
2011 10 6 16 
   
12,141,462  
   
5,248,866  
   
185,836,455  
   
949,382,097  
   
175,841,532  
2010 9 7 16 
   
17,668,584  
   
12,931,441  
   
182,504,814  
   
726,960,580  
   
172,509,891  
2009 8 8 16 
   
23,195,706  
   
20,614,016  
   
179,173,173  
   
504,539,063  
   
169,178,250  
2008 8 7 15 
   
28,722,828  
   
28,296,591  
   
175,841,532  
   
282,117,546  
   
165,846,609  
2007 6 6 12 
   
8,043,165 
   
6,083,439  
   
28,384,891  
   
328,615,194  
   
162,514,968  
2006 6 6 12 
   
1,119,449 
   
737,149  
   
28,893,886  
   
174,553,866  
   
159,183,327  
2005 6 3 9 
   
751,033  
   
501,515  
   
14,071,924  
   
169,178,250  
   
155,851,686  
2004 3 4 7 
   
951,750  
   
637,473  
   
2,702,830  
   
165,846,609  
   
152,520,045  
2003 3 4 7 
   
810,639  
   
556,573  
   
2,365,357  
   
161,152,318  
   
149,188,404  
Diamond 
2014 10 6 16 
   
24,413,014  
   
22,057,198  
   
205,660,767  
   
1,750,270,423  
   
205,660,767  
2013 10 6 16 
   
33,250,472  
   
29,754,520  
   
138,303,224  
   
1,354,930,871  
   
138,303,224  
2012 9 6 15 
   
27,481,541  
   
22,108,084  
   
85,981,016  
   
1,178,103,754  
   
10,885,572  
2011 9 6 15 
   
179,597,333  
   
17,964,929  
   
105,310,679  
   
796,231,792  
   
85,981,016  
2010 10 6 16 
   
9,468,016 
   
6,522,455  
   
116,881,159  
   
548,402,560  
   
116,881,159  
2009 10 6 16 
   
9,055,793 
   
4,883,446  
   
110,358,704  
   
604,000,914  
   
110,358,704  
2008 10 6 16 
   
15,059,114  
   
11,822,011  
   
116,983,008  
   
603,326,540  
   
116,983,008  
2007 10 6 16 
   
8,792,775 
   
6,930,754  
   
53,891,777  
   
312,249,722  
   
53,892,227  
2006 8 6 14 
   
5,292,194 
   
3,849,545  
   
34,969,570  
   
223,047,862  
   
34,969,570  
2005 8 6 14 
   
3,522,317 
   
2,526,552  
   
20,709,850  
   
124,994,957  
   
20,709,850  
2004 8 6 14 1,161,746 833,498  6,751,094  69,061,679  6,751,094 
2003 6 4 10 
   
3,173,770 
   
145,113  
   
5,206,636  
   
59,295,392  












































2013 7 1 8 
   
70,631,000  
   
70,631,000  
   
308,101,000  
   
311,811,000  
   
308,101,000  
2012 5 1 6 
   
(819,000) 
   
(819,000) 
   
269,893,000  
   
270,977,000  
   
269,893,000  
2011 10 9 19 
   
52,528,000  
   
47,462,000  
   
373,572,000  
   
2,463,543,000  
   
375,572,000  
2010 10 9 19 
   
33,537,000  
   
32,123,000  
   
345,922,000  
   
1,962,444,000  
   
345,922,000  
2009 7 5 12 
   
46,110,000  
   
35,074,000  
   
351,054,000  
   
1,667,422,000  
   
351,054,000  
2008 7 5 12 
   
3,802,000 
   
30,473,000  
   
339,847,000  
   
1,165,461,000  
   
339,847,000  
2007 9 7 16 
   
22,097,000  
   
18,355,000  
   
77,351,000  
   
762,881,000  
   
77,351,000  
2006 8 7 15 
   
19,831,000  
   
6,053,000  
   
60,980,000  
   
540,129,000  
   
60,980,000  
2005 3 6 9 
   
15,145,000  
   
12,184,000  
   
44,672,000  
   
377,496,000  
   
44,672,000  
2004 3 6 9 
   
14,106,000  
   
11,096,000  
   
38,621,000  
   
31,249,000  
   
38,621,000  
2003 8 7 15 
   
13,393,000  
   
10,323,000  
   
25,040,000  
   
320,578,000  




2014 9 6 15 
   
15,515,000  
   
13,796,000  
   
173,111,000  
   
1,187,025,000  
   
173,111,000  
2013 9 6 15 
   
9,028,000 
   
7,721,000  
   
163,455,000  
   
1,081,217,000  
   
163,455,000  
2012 11 6 17 
   
21,349,000  
   
17,924,000  
   
145,972,000  
   
737,732,000  
   
145,972,000  
2011 11 6 17 
   
1,474,000 
   
3,911,000  
   
146,852,000  
   
497,553,000  
   
146,852,000  
2010 10 6 16 
   
6,831,645 
   
4,833,101  
   
36,982,179  
   
650,318,227  
   
36,982,179  
2009 10 6 16 
   
3,074,418 
   
2,027,677  
   
31,850,169  
   
362,098,549  
   
31,850,164  
2008 10 3 13 
   
15,795,951  
   
12,986,570  
   
135,863,988  
   
533,122,233  
   
135,863,988  
2007 10 3 13 
   
4,403,393 
   
4,160,007  
   
29,757,000  
   
217,144,465  
   
29,757,000  
2006 11 3 14 
   
1,650,499 
   
1,305,854  
   
25,596,993  
   
119,985,801  
   
25,596,993  
2005 11 3 14 
   
3,587,300 
   
3,162,347  
   
9,723,548  
   
34,953,351  
   
9,723,548 
2004 11 3 14 
   
5,524,101 
   
5,018,840  
   
6,149,897  
   
25,079,099  
   
6,149,897 
2003 11 3 14 
   
7,460,902 
   
6,875,333  
   
2,023,342  
   
13,111,549  



































































































































21 6 27 
   
100,461,729  
   
85,545,510  
   
329,646,681  
   
1,904,365,795  




7 4 11 
   
100,141,667  
   
64,745,101  
   
288,153,630  
   
1,620,317,223  




7 4 11 
   
64,745,101  
   
51,653,251  
   
216,445,185  
   
1,083,304,116  




8 6 14 
   
47,568,458  
   
39,320,255  
   
214,223,531  
   
1,168,052,897  
   
220,254,216  
2009 8 6 14 
   
35,012,534  
   
28,603,078  
   
193,124,102  
   
1,079,516,749  
   
198,266,041  
2008 8 6 14 
   
34,457,066  
   
28,073,252  
   
179,550,725  
   
921,817,327  
   
179,550,725  
2007 8 6 14 
   
27,198,704  
   
21,489,885  
   
161,053,064  
   
717,999,797  
   
161,053,064  
2006 10 4 14 
   
10,024,936  
   
7,905,506  
   
36,445,542  
   
305,080,565  
   
36,445,542  
2005 10 4 14 
   
7,004,243 
   
5,330,796  
   
33,468,036  
   
167,897,704  
   
33,468,036  
2004 10 4 14 
   
5,029,725 
   
4,056,557  
   
11,617,978  
   
119,698,240  
   
11,617,978  
2003 10 5 15 
   
3,802,500 
   
3,211,439  
   
9,661,421  
   
83,310,731  
   
9,661,421 
WEMA 
2014 10 7 17 
   
3,093,940 
   
2,372,445  
   
43,768,649  
   
382,562,312  
   
43,768,649  
2013 10 7 17 
   
1,947,308 
   
1,596,531  
   
41,395,151  
   
330,872,475  
   
41,395,151  
2012 7 5 12 
   
(4,942,211) 
   
(5,040,629) 
   
(5,040,629) 
   
221,157,042  
   
6,268,131 
2011 7 5 12 
   
(3,770,021) 
   
(4,228,926) 
   
(4,228,926) 
   
199,348,267  
   
10,512,746  
2010 10 4 14 
   
12,964,108  
   
16,238,533  
   
14,837,275  
   
203,144,627  
   
14,837,276  
2009 14 7 21 
   
(3,309,254) 
   
(2,094,692) 
   
(45,499,114) 
   
142,785,723  
   
(45,499,114) 
2008 14 7 21 
   
(1,582,616) 
   
(2,027,917) 
   
(15,835,503) 
   
112,426,819  
   
(15,835,504) 
2007 10 7 17 
   
1,878,698 
   
255,409,800  
   
251,827,500  
   
165,081,532  
   
251,827,050  
2006 10 7 17 
   
(7,200,230) 
   
660,196,100  
   
205,400,100  
   
120,109,067  
   
205,400,010  
2005 5 4 9 
   
1,016,230 
   
844,285,000  
   
242,588,600  
   
97,909,060  
   
242,588,600  
2004 5 4 9 
   
1,420,019 
   
967,148,000  
   
804,034,800  
   
71,423,836  




2003 9 4 13 
   
2,286,027 
   
144,777,500  
   
721,539,300  
   
61,323,432  






































































































































2013 6 5 11 
   
51,841,000  
   
46,483,000  
   
46,483,000  
   
2,217,417,000  
   
259,538,000  
2012 10 7 17 
   
46,180,000  
   
47,375,000  
   
220,317,000  
   
1,933,065,000  
   
220,317,000  
2011 10 7 17 
   
(26,468,000) 
   
(7,966,000) 
   
187,356,000  
   
1,440,724,000  
   
187,356,000  
2010 10 7 17 
   
3,693,000 
   
2,167,000  
   
187,730,000  
   
1,432,632,000  
   
187,730,000  
2009 10 7 17 
   
15,964,000  
   
12,889,000  
   
187,719,000  
   
1,400,879,000  
   
187,719,000  
2008 10 5 15 
   
54,637,000  
   
40,002,000  
   
188,155,000  
   
1,520,093,000  
   
188,155,000  
2007 10 5 15 
   
28,615,000  
   
19,831,000  
   
164,821,000  
   
1,102,348,000  
   
164,821,000  
2006 8 7 15 
   
12,514,000  
   
11,469,000  
   
47,621,000  
   
851,241,000  
   
47,621,000  
2005 8 7 15 
   
6,239,000 
   
4,653,000  
   
17,702,000  
   
248,928,000  
   
19,378,000  
2004 10 14 24 
   
5,608,000 
   
4,185,000  
   
18,059,000  
   
208,806,000  
   
21,444,000  
2003 10 5 15 
   
4,977,000 
   
3,717,000  
   
18,416,000  
   
168,684,000  



















Descriptive statistics  




       Mean 0.6139   0.2646  
Median 0.6000   0.1321  
Maximum 0.8750   3.4803  
Minimum 0.3333   -5.9472  
Standard Deviation 0.1026   0.9433  
Sample Variance 0.0105   0.8898  
Jarque-Bera 51.5667   22.2257  
Prob 0   0  
Observations 84   84  
       
BC: Board Composition;ROCE: Return on Capital Employed  
Source: Researchers’ Computation using E-views 7.0 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
